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1.
Writing half a century ago, Kenneth Burke argued
 
that to one degree or another all persuasive discourse
 obeys a "principle of courtship” whose purpose lies in
 “the transcending of social estrangement” (208). As
 Burke explains this principle,
[i]n its essence communication involves the use
 
of verbal symbols for
 
purposes of appeal. Thus it  
splits formally into the three elements of
 
speak ­
er, speech, and spoken-to, with the speaker so
 shaping his speech as to “commune” with the
 spoken-to. This purely technical pattern is the
 precondition of all appeal. And “standoffishness”
 is necessary to the form, because without it the
 appeal could not
 
be maintained.. . . Rhetorically,  
there can be courtship only insofar as there is
 division. (271)
Burke identifies this primordial and self-sustaining
 
“standoffishness” — which corresponds roughly to
 the notion of desire in Lacanian psychoanalysis and
 to that of différance in Derridean theory1 — as a
 defining element of “pure persuasion” (269) and as an
 irreducible quality of self-interference present to 
one degree or another within all rhetorical performance.
No major work of English literature better exem
­
plifies the courtship-function of rhetorical 
appeal than does Shakespeare’s Othello. As Alan Sinfield,
 
for
 one, has observed, the play’s “action advances  
through a contest of stories” (30) whereby Iago’s tale
1
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of adultery undoes what Othello’s tales of travel and heroism have achieved for
 
him. Thus, although Othellos preoccupation with narrativity has been estab
­lished by a number of previous critics,2 I would like to reexamine it in light of
 Burke’s analysis and the concept
 
of “standoffishness” that grounds it. My points  
in conducting this examination are three. First, I believe that if Othello com
­prises an extended act of courtship, the self-interference intrinsic to that 
act
 is  
concentrated disproportionately within a single dramatic role: that of Iago.
 Second, I would note that, in his capacity as the principle of
 
rhetorical self ­
interference incarnate, Iago repeatedly conceives the 
act
 of union as a violation  
of perceptual categories: not only those of race and nationality but also of rank
 and gender and ultimately of species itself. In terms of this latter point, it
 would
 
be easy to see Iago’s obsession with violated boundaries as voicing a gen ­
eralized anxiety over
 
the collapse of social categories, in which case Othello begs  
to be 
read,
 in Burke’s phrase, as a document of “‘social lewdness’ mythically  
expressed in sexual terms” (208). However — and this is my third and final
 point — the interest in crossing lines is not
 
Iago’s alone, and when it appears in  
the language of other characters it figures not so much as a transgression to be
 shunned but rather as a consummation to be wished. To this extent, it embod
­ies a rhetorical impulse for the elucidation of which we must look beyond the
 work of Kenneth Burke to the more recent theoretical writings of Gilles
 Deleuze and Félix Guattari, where it surfaces as the principle of deterritorial-
 ization.
2.
In a reading of Othello that figured, on its first appearance, as 
one
 of the foun ­
dational documents of the New Historicism, Stephen Greenblatt has drawn
 notice to the play’s “ceaseless narrative invention” (235), an invention that
 
tends  
both to convert eros to storytelling and to translate storytelling into eros. 
For Greenblatt, Othello
'
s characters “have always already submitted to narrativity”  
(237), and thus the tale of Othello’s doomed love for Desdemona is, among
 other things, also the tale of Desdemona’s love for the tale of Othello’s life.
 Othello himself narrates matters as follows, nesting the story of his life within
 the story
 
of his love  within the scene of his trial within the play of his undoing:
I spoke of most disastrous chances:
Of moving accidents by flood and field,
Of hair-breadth scapes i’ th’ imminent deadly breach,
Of being taken by the insolent foe
And sold to slavery, of my redemption thence
And portance in my [travel’s] history;
These things to hear
Would Desdemona seriously incline;
But still the house affairs would draw her thence,
Which ever as she could with haste dispatch,
2
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She’ld come again, and
 
with a greedy ear
 Devour up my discourse. (1.3.134-9, 145-50)




 Globe audience with the tale of Othello, in which Oth ­
ello woos another audience — the Venetian senate — with the tale of Othello
 woofrig yet another audience — Desdemona — with the tale of Othello. Nor
 is Desdemona the only
 
character to experience the erotic pull of this overdeter ­
mined narrativity; as the Duke observes of
 
the Moor’s performance, “I think  
this tale would win my daughter too” (1.3.171). The express tendency of the
 narrative drive in this scene is toward a union simultaneously rhetorical and
 erotic in character. Thus when Othello reaches out to the Venetian senate by
 recapitulating his act of outreach to Desdemona, readers and viewers of Shake
­
speare
’s play, too, participate in a pattern of storytelling superimposed upon  
itself, reencountering itself in different settings so that the very act of listening
 to the Moor’s tale becomes an act of structural communion with other listeners
 in other contexts, all of whom seem to repeat the originary model of Desde
­mona, devouring up Othello’s discourse.
I say that this structural repetition seems to originate with Desdemona, but
 
in truth it does not. In 
fact,
 Desdemona’s role as Othello’s archetypal audience  
derives from yet another,
 
prior  model: the aggrieved Brabantio himself. Again,  
Othello’s account of his love for
 
Desdemona provides the central evidence here:
Her father lov’
d
 me, oft invited me;
Still question’
d
 me the story of my life
From 
year
 to year — the [battles], sieges, [fortunes],
That I have pass’d.
These things to hear





This storytelling, the 
effect
 and extension of Brabantio’s “love” for Othello,  
becomes in turn the catalyst, extension, and — as Desdemona plucks up her
 spirits and asks Othello to tell more stories directly to her (150-5) — 
effect
 of  
Desdemona’s love for the same man. The storytelling-relation-that-is-also-a-
 love-relation is apparently no respecter of genders; developing between men, it
 simply reimprints itself
 
within the dynamic of heterosexual courtship before  
transferring itself, in further turn, to the legal context of Othello’s trial and to
 the theatrical context of Shakespeare’s play. The result is a kind of courtship
 one cannot adequately 
describe
 in terms of the masculine homosocial dynamic  
that Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick and others have viewed as exemplary of much
 Shakespearean love-discourse. In that dynamic women tend to serve as the
 markers of a prior and supervening attachment between men,3 but for Othello
 the attachment is not so easily stratified into the relation of privileged signified
 (a man’s love for another man) and subordinate signifier (a man’s relation to a
 woman related to a beloved man). Rather than standing for Brabantio, Desde
­mona in an important sense becomes him.
3
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In doing so, I
 
would argue, she threatens to attain the condition of absolute  
communion that comprises the ideal end of Othellos rhetoric: a condition in
 which fathers and daughters, senators and groundlings, tales and their innu
­merable retellings all coalesce, achieving a polymorphous reciprocity — per
­haps, given the erotic nature of Othello’s storytelling, even a polymorphous
 perversity
 
— that nullifies the social and psychic divisions presupposed by the  
rhetoric itself. This condition especially transcends the fundamental distinc
­tion between speaker and auditor, a point manifest in Desdemona’s response to
 Othello’s tale:
She swore, in faith ’twas strange, ’twas passing strange,
 
’Twas pitiful, ’twas wondrous pitiful.
She wish’d she had not heard it, yet she wish’
d
That heaven had made her such a man. (160-3)
The line “she wish’d / That heaven had made her such a man,” with its famous
 
syntactical ambiguity, points toward the dissolution of personhood that results
 from successful rhetoric and successful courtship. Poised against the possibili
­ty that heaven might indeed make Desdemona such a man — in one sense of
 the phrase or another — is Desdemona’s own unwillingness to hear a story that
 is difficult to endure precisely because it assails the bounds of her being. As
 Burke has remarked, there can only be courtship so long as there is division.
 Desdemona’s reluctance to hear the story that fascinates her serves simultane
­ously to register the attraction of the promised communion and the anxiety that
 it provokes.
Yet it is in the figure of Iago that this anxiety
 
takes up particular residence,  
with the result that Iago initiates the dominant counter-movement of Shake
­speare’s play: a concerted pattern of resistance to the principle of communion
 exemplified by Othello’s rhetoric. At bottom, it
 
is Iago’s job to sustain division,  
and by sustaining it to sustain all the varied rhetorical operations — the innu
­merable acts of courtship and appeal and solicitation — that presuppose 
it. Thus, where Othello’s storytelling 
marks
 a primary moment of conjunction  
whereby father and daughter, Brabantio and Desdemona, achieve equivalence
 in their relation to the Moor, Iago nurtures a sense of loss:
 Awake! what ho, Brabantio! thieves, thieves!
Look to your house, your daughter, and your bags! (1.1.79-80)
And again,
[’Zounds], sir, y’are robb’d! For shame, put on your gown;
Your heart is burst, you have lost half your soul. (86-7)
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he that filches from me my good name
Robs me of that which not enriches him,
And makes me poor indeed. (3.3.159-61)
Iago’s fascination with money, with getting it and spending it and hoarding
 
it and stealing it, is of course a staple of
 his
 character. My point here is that  
t  fascination 
registers
 more than material profit and loss; it registers linguis ­
tic loss as well, a linguistic loss well represented by the theft of one’s “good
 name.” Moreover, once it is abstracted from particular material transactions
 and contexts, the preoccupation with what is missing informs Iago’s behavior
 on a grand scale. For instance, recent scholars in queer theory have rightly cau
­tioned us not to read 
early
 modern literary documents as expressive of a bina ­
rized economy of heterosexual and homosexual desire, an 
economy
 that it is  
anachronistic 
to
 ascribe to early modern sexual thought and social practice;4  
yet, in an almost uncannily prophetic way, Iago himself 
encourages
 just this sort  
of binary impulse
 
by organizing the  personal relationships of Shakespeare’s play  
according to the laws of urinary segregation. He gets along famously with men,
 after all, and his facility in managing Roderigo and 
Cassio
 and Brabantio and  
Othello contrasts both against
 his
 invidious, highly charged relations with Des ­
demona and Emilia
 
and against  Othello’s initial solidarity with Desdemona. In  
effect, Othello’s belief in the existence of a fictive love triangle between him
­self, Desdemona, and Cassio serves as the ex post
 
facto expression of a real, pre ­
existent triangle between Iago, Othello, and Desdemona. This latter triangle,
 in turn, receives double consecration in Othello’s holy union with Desdemona
 and in the “sacred vow” (3.3.461) with which Othello and Iago later seal their
 confederacy. This vow, almost a homoerotic betrothal ceremony,5 renders the
 binarisms of Iago’s character into a structural principle of Shakespeare’s play;
 Othello may either choose his wife or his ancient, his woman or his man. In
 either case, gain goes hand in hand with loss.
Nor does Iago’s preoccupation with loss confine itself to questions of gen
­
der; it operates 
equally
 on the level of genre, where Iago’s language displays a  
clear preference for
 
certain modes of articulation,  certain speech acts. Although  
Greenblatt has viewed Iago’s 
villainy
 as a kind of “narrative fashioning” that  
extends and recapitulates the narrative preoccupations of other figures (237),
 one remarkable feature of Iago’s character is the way in
 
which it stakes out pet  
modes of expression distinct from those
 
of other characters, particularly Othel ­
lo. Thus, where Othello tells tales and gives commands, Iago offers advice,
 solicits advancement (or complains about its absence), issues warnings, and
 negotiates agreements. These latter are all classic 
gestures
 of courtship, in  
Burke’s sense of the term, and of courtiership as well; thus they are appropriate
 to a figure
 
who inhabits a divided world,  who fraternizes mostly with men, and  
with men whose interaction is governed by intricately devised systems of mili
­tary and courtly rank and protocol. In any case, Iago’s language is populated
 
by  
signature gestures of appeal and solicitation, beginning with 
his
 first long  
speech (“Why, there’s no remedy. ’Tis the curse of service; / Preferment goes
 by letter and 
affection
” [1.1.34-5]); continuing through his cultivation of  
Roderigo (“I hate the Moor. . . . Let us be conjunctive in our revenge against
5
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him” [1.3.366,367-8]); and extending ultimately to his successful
 
temptation of  
Othello himself (“You would 
be
 satisfied? . . . / Would you, the [supervisor],  
grossly gape on?” [3.3.393,
 
395]). In  effect, where Othello says  “Let me tell you  
a story,” Iago says “Let me make you a deal.”
This discursive preference, in turn, entails certain consequences on the
 
level  
of character. With his repeated petitions and promises and offers and incen
­tives, Iago displays certain 
affinities
 for the “comedy of non-interaction” that  
Gabriele Jackson has identified
 
in Ben Jonsons early work  (1). For Jackson, the  
characters of Jonsonian comedy are “sundered from the outside world
 
by urgent  
attention to an inner clamor” (26); they ricochet off of one another like billiard
 balls while in pursuit of the idiosyncratic obsessions that define them. As for
 Iago, a similar dynamic invests his dealings
 
with others, since those dealings are  
consistently predicated upon the furthering of individual suits. Whether the
 suit in question is Iago’s own (his 
failed
 quest for military promotion; his suc ­
cessful quest for revenge) or someone else’s project pursued with his encour
­agement (Roderigo’s effort to seduce Desdemona; Brabantio’s 
legal
 action  
against Othello; Cassio’s petition to Desdemona for aid in regaining 
his
 lieu ­
tenancy), the dramatic actions associated with Iago are all of a piece, 
involving the pursuit of an idée fixe under whose influence the suitor in question some
­how loses the ability to communicate with others. Even Iago himself, whose
 capacity to recognize and capitalize upon the obsessions of others is of course
 formidable, seems unable, in the end, to understand that his wife might
 
find his  
villainy intolerable; this is, at the least, a  major  lapse in judgment. For the suit ­
or entangled in a project of the sort encouraged by Iago, the project itself
 becomes a means of establishing and maintaining a certain personal distance,
 and once again, that distance is the very sort without which rhetoric as
 courtship would 
be
 unthinkable.
To this extent, 
we
 may in fact regard Othello and Iago as complementary  
expressions of the two contradictory imperatives that invest and sustain rhetoric
 according to Burke’s formulation of the matter. On one hand, Othello embod
­ies the impulse to commune, 
to
 unite, to extend and escape the self in ways that  
ultimately entail a rewriting and eventually an unwriting of personal identity.
 On the other hand, Iago exists to keep the self — and selfhood — intact; he
 employs language to maneuver for personal 
advantage,
 and he does so by gen ­
erating and exploiting various kinds of misunderstanding. Indeed, Iago’s dis
­cursive habits are almost a parody of Othello’s. The Moor’s stories change their
 audience by enforcing an exchange of identities, a kind of cross-pollination
 whereby speaker and listeners enter and inform one another; Iago’s plots and
 agreements, conversely, are founded upon the illusion of exchange, upon the
 hearer’s misguided apprehension that there has been a meeting of minds where
 none has actually occurred. As for the idea that minds — 
or
 bodies, or selves  
— might actually achieve a state of dynamic mutuality, Iago has a notorious
 way of imaging this possibility, and it is to this pattern of imagery that I now
 turn.
6




In his compendious Institutes of the Laws of England, Edward Coke concludes
 
his brief discussion of the 
crime
 of buggery by noting that this “detestable and  
abominable sin” (sig. I3v) was first criminalized during
 
the reign of Henry VIIL  
Uncharacteristically, Coke explains the Henrician anti-buggery statute via
 anecdote; it
 
was formulated, he observes, because “a great Lady had committed  
Buggery with a Baboon, and conceived by it, etc.” (sig. I4r). Coke does not
 name 
his
 source for this story, and its concluding “etc.,” suggesting both the  
inevitable and the unimaginable, equally tantalizes and infuriates. From the
 late-twentieth-century standpoint, of course, the monstrous birth that Coke
 describes is a biological impossibility, and yet its very factitiousness renders it
 all the more unnerving. A narrative invention that exceeds the possibilities of
 the world as we know it, Coke’s baboon-child simultaneously embodies a social
 regime’s anxieties about transgression of
 
the order of nature and figures forth  
the unselfconscious determination of that same regime to transgress the nature
 that grounds its anxiety.
As for the anxiety itself, I have already argued that Iago lends concerted
 
expression to something very similar: an obsessive concern with the possible
 loss of the self 
and
 the language that subtends it, a concern represented in large  
part through febrile fantasies of gender- and race- and species-mixing. These
 last are perhaps Iago’s most notorious turns of phrase, and they draw upon the
 same 
uneasiness
 and the same patterns of thought that inform Coke’s baboon  
anecdote. For Iago, the miscegenous lovemaking of Othello and Desdemona
 threatens to produce just the same sort of denatured conception; being “cover’d
 with a Barbary horse” (1.1.111-2), Desdemona will become the dam to a
 
brood  
of centaurs; Brabantio 
will
 “have coursers for cousins, and gennets for germans”  
(113), and the scions of his house will not speak but neigh. Such stuff owes its
 origin to a twofold discursive tradition: on one hand a pattern of legal and the
­ological thinking (exemplified by Coke, among others) that conceives various
 sexual conjunctions as socially and morally objectionable because they violate a
 variously conceived order of nature, and 
on
 the other hand a medical discourse  
(well represented by the obstetrical texts of Ambroise Paré)6 that purports to
 document the monstrous results of such unnatural
 
unions (see figure 1). Work ­
ing with the two separate but interrelated strands of this tradition, Iago can
Figure 1. Figure of a colt with a
 
mans face, from Ambroise Pare,
 On Monsters and Marvels 6.
 Cf. Othello 1.1.111-3: “You’
ll have your daughter cover’d with
 a Barbary horse, you’ll have
 your nephews neigh to you;
 you’ll have 
coursers
 for cousins,  
and gennets for germans.”
7
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Figure 2. Figure of two twins
 
having only one head from
 Pare' 15. Compare Othello
 1.1.115-7: “Your daughter
 and the Moor are now mak-
ing
 
the beast with two backs.
even read the medical discourse of obstetrical mon
­
strosity proleptically into the act of “unnatural”
 procreation itself; that is the point of his famous
 euphemism for sex, “making the beast with two
 backs” (1.1.116-7; cf. figure 2), for this compact
 and poisonous description endows the lovemaking
 of Othello and Desdemona with a deformity pre
­figuring that of the equine offspring the lovemak
­ing will purportedly produce.
To this extent, Iago
'
s reliance upon a medico-  
juridical vocabulary of sexual monstrosity may even
 foreshadow the later development of a Foucauldian
 scientia sexualis, the vast disciplinary project — of
 transforming sex into an object of dispassionate
 scientific observation — that Foucault found to be
 characteristic of western societies from the eigh
­teenth century onward.7 As Jurgis Baltrusaitis has
 demonstrated, the teratology of authors like Paré
 derives from a medieval mode of “réalisme fantas
­tique” supplemented by Teveil d’
une
 pensée réal ­
iste” (331), and this particular discursive quality,
 the very concern for professional observation and
 documentation that distinguishes Iago’s source
 material from Othello’s, allies the former with an
 emergent scientific discourse of undeniable power
 
and
 prestige. In his meditation upon the social  
constructedness of sexuality, Foucault contrasted
 this western scientia sexualis with an eastern ars
 erotica exemplified by sex treatises such as the
 Kama Sutra (57-8), and it would be tempting to
 discover a similar opposition in Othello. However,
what Shakespeare gives us is less an ars erotica than an eroticized ars narrandi,
 
through which Othello, too, like Iago, can activate a 
vocabulary
 of physical  
monstrosity:
of antres vast and deserts idle,
Rough quarries, rocks, [and] hills whose [heads] touch heaven,
It was my hint to speak — such was my process 
—
And of the Cannibals that each [other] eat,
The Anthropophagi, and men whose heads
[Do grow] beneath their 
shoulders.
 (1.3.140-5)
As Lisa Hopkins has recently noted, Othello’s character “is inserted into
 
pre-existing discourses of travel that must radically inform and structure his
 ostensibly experiential account. Even as Othello thinks he tells his story, it in
 fact tells him” (163). Yet, as I have just pointed out, one may say precisely the
 same thing about Iago. Ultimately
 
what separates Othello from Iago in this  
8
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respect is not so much
 
their subjection to
 narrativity but rather
 the precise kind of
 narrativity to which
 they are subject; Oth
­ello’s monsters remain
 distinct from Iago’s,
 both with regard to
 their ontological sta
­tus and their literary
 antecedents. As to
 the latter of these
 points, Othello clear
­ly draws upon differ
­ent source material
 than does his ancient:
 not the discourse of
Figure 3. Figure of a female monster without a head, front and back
 
views, from Paré 36. This illustration may be viewed as a
 pathologized counterinstance of Othello’s “men whose heads /
 [Do grow] beneath their shoulders” (1.3.144-5).
medical abnormality
 
(cf. figure 3) and the-
 ologico-judicial cen
­sure, but rather that of
 the medieval travel
­ogue and bestiary tradition. Moreover, this preference for certain kinds of
 source matter has broad implications for the nature of monstrosity itself, which
 emerges in Othello’s language not as an index of individual depravity and per
­version but as an emblem of the breadth and diversity of creation. Where
 Iago’s monsters narrow the world — dividing it into the familiar and the per
­verse, the former to be protected and the latter to 
be
 eradicated — Othello’s  
monsters widen it, attesting to the lure of the exotic as well as to Othello’s own
 ability to render the fantastic accessible. To this extent Othello’s handkerchief
 is like his Anthropophagi — a narrative construct whose strangeness carries
 with it a charge of erotic fascination even as it conflates the fabulous with the
 quotidian:
That handkerchief
Did an Egyptian to my mother give;
She was a charmer, and could almost read
The thoughts of people. She told her, while she kept it,
 
’Twould make her amiable, and subdue my father
 Entirely to her love. . . .
[T] here’s magic in the web of it.
A sibyl, that had numb’red in the world
The sun 
to
 course two hundred compasses,
In her prophetic fury 
sew
’d the work;
The worms were hallowed that did breed the silk,
 And it was dy’d in mummy which the skillful
 Conserv’d of maiden’s hearts. (3.4.55-60, 69-75)
 
9
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Again here, as in his speech to the Venetian senate, Othello uses the story
­
telling function to collapse distances and elide contexts. The gift of
 
Othello’s  
handkerchief is in part the gift of its story,
 
which in turn is the story  of its gift,  
from sibyl to Egyptian charmer to Othello’s mother to Othello’s father to Oth
­ello himself
 
to Desdemona, the story of this gift ending with the gift’s origins  
and being entirely prefigured in the “prophetic fury” of the sibyl’s work, which
 in turn is repeated within the myriad retellings of the tale it has itself antici
­pated. Likewise, Othello’s storytelling once again draws upon particular
 sources,
 
its evocation of Egypt and enchantment and the “mummy” drawn from  
maiden’s hearts all suggesting that great original of western travel writers,
 Herodotus, and the tradition of 
travelogue
 and romance descending from his  
work. In the case of Othello’s handkerchief-narrative, the nature of the story
­telling has shifted a bit; it has begun to assume a threatening cast, not 
simply inviting Desdemona to identify with it but also browbeating her for not having
 identified with it closely enough. This fact may in itself bear witness to the
 strain under which Othello’s narrative invention has been placed by Iago’s
 insinuations, but it also attests to the extraordinary quality of the 
narrative itself. Othello’s tale may attach 
an
 impossibly heavy weight of meaning to  
something as common and trivial as a handkerchief, but that, in a sense, is Oth
­ello’s fonction as a dramatic character: to transform everything into a kind of
 thick description. His signature gestures — the characteristic recourse to a nar
­rative function that conflates disparate times and places and people by giving
 them common 
and
 endlessly recursive roles within the narrative itself; the  
reliance upon a literary tradition grounded in catalogues of marvels such as
 those assembled by the travelogue writer and the bestiarist; and the tendency to
 dwell upon tales of
 
the strange, wondrous, and marvelous in such a way as to  
render them attractively exotic rather than repulsively unnatural — all of these
 combine to produce a particular rhetorical effect, an unusually powerful drive
 toward what Burke has called “the transcending of social estrangement.”
In the final section of this essay, I will try to characterize the apparent
 
objective of this rhetorical function more precisely, 
and
 to do so I must move  
beyond the rhetorical analysis of Burke to a more recent theoretical vocabulary,
 developed by Deleuze and Guattari specifically 
to
 provide a means of thinking  
beyond the construction of individual character and personal identity.
4.
Unlike Burke, whose concerns lie mostly with the form and nature of rhetoric
 
as it is, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari seek to theorize an alternative to the
 social relations that make such rhetoric possible. If
 
Burke views “standoffish-  
ness” as a precondition of all linguistic appeal, Deleuzian analysis might well
 argue that that is because Burke describes language as a product of “state phi
­losophy” (Thousand
 
Plateaus xi): that is, as a structure of  meaning predicated  
upon the unity 
and
 self-identity of  “the thinking subject,” an identity that is  
recapitulated in the concepts the subject creates “and 
to
 which it lends its own  
presumed attributes of sameness and constancy” {Thousand Plateaus xi). In
 
10
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short, if language nourishes an irreducible alienation of the speaking subject,
 
that is because language itself is first and foremost not a 
means
 of “transcend ­
ing social estrangement” (this being only a secondary and incidental effect of
 linguistic appeal) but in fact a means of fabricating the unitary “I.” For any sub
­ject operating in the world of Burkean rhetoric, ego-construction is the first —
 and last — order of
 business,
 its primacy merely confirmed by the rhetorical  
drive to overcome the alienation that defines it.
But might it be possible 
to
 deploy language so that it does not “immure  
itself in the edifice of an ordered interiority” (Thousand Plateaus xii)? Could
 one remove the principle of standoffishness from its position as simultaneous
­ly the motivating force and the preeminent product of
 
semiotic exchange? To  
do so, Deleuze 
and
 Guattari argue, one must re-theorize identity and its rela ­
tion to linguistic expression, a relation whose traditional commitment to ideas
 of interiority is signaled by the etymology of the word “expression” itself (from
 exprimere, literally “to press out”). The challenge here is to rethink the 
subject as a multiple and mutable construct, formulated through relations of externali
­ty and through a logic of metonymy rather than metaphor. Deleuze and Guat
­tari thus lend particular privilege to tropes of flight and escape, both literal and
 
figurat
ive, that lead from an ordered and therefore restrictive center to a vari ­
ously conceived outside. In Deleuzian terminology, the ordered center comes
 
to
 be known as a “territory”: that is, an enclosed material or biological or spa ­
tial or linguistic or conceptual space to which have been assigned particular
 structural principles and qualities (of identity, property, value, etcetera). The
 practice of flight from such enclosures, on the other hand, is what Deleuze and
 Guattari call “deterritorialization.” In the last few pages of this essay, I would
 like to suggest that the latter concept offers a useful
 
way of understanding Oth ­
ello’s approach to narrative, which is more complex than standard alienation
­based semiotic models give it credit for being.8
In one sense, Othello’s commitment to patterns of exteriority is obvious
 
enough. He is, as Iago notes, “of a free and open nature” (1.3.399), 
and
 this  
openness contrasts markedly with Iago’s guardedness and duplicity. What one  
sees of Othello is what one gets, up to and including a physical blackness sur
­prisingly free from any pejorative significance as an external 
index
 of personal  
character or racial inclination. (As Janet Adelman has recently demonstrated,
 the pejorative racial associations in Shakespeare’s play originate with Iago, for
 whom they externalize a sense of inward deficiency that can 
be
 well accounted  
for by object-relations psychology.)9 In effect, the story of Othello’s downfall
 is the story of how he loses this exteriorized sense of self, exchanging it for the
 paradigm of self-division that informs Iago’s character. As Hopkins has put 
it, Iago “is able to effect a gradual shift in Othello’s horizons of narrative expecta
­tion” (168). The end result of this shift is that Othello and Desdemona engage
 in a pattern of sustained misunderstanding, recently traced by Harry Berger, Jr.
 (“Trifling” passim), whereby they conspire to lose — and then to forget that
 they have conspired to lose — Desdemona’s handkerchief. To this extent, Iago
 manages to install a kind of linguistic self-interference in Othello’s and Desde
­mona’s relationship; he makes their own words conspirators against them.
But as far as Othello’s own instincts are concerned, signs are not separate
 
from subjects, nor signifiers from signifieds: instead, “signs are "embedded’ 
in 
11
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situations, not fully separated from bodies, specific places, rituals, gestures, sto
­
ries, etcetera, yet not entirely fixed in their relationship to one another” (Bogue
 98). Again, Desdemona
'
s handkerchief offers an outstanding case in point. On  
one hand, its 
significance
 is inextricable from the bodies, places, and rituals  
with which it is associated, yet at the same time those bodies, places, and ritu
­als shift place in and through and around each other. Thus, for 
one
 thing, it  
becomes naggingly difficult to track
 
the feminine pronoun references in Othel ­
lo's description of the handkerchief:
That handkerchief
Did an Egyptian to my mother give;
She was a charmer, and could almost 
read
The thoughts of people. She told her, while she kept it,
 ’Twould make her amiable, and subdue my father
 Entirely to her love . . . (3.4.55-60)
This peculiar array of linguistic shifters 
manages
 to fix the meaning of the  
handkerchief by attaching a massive weight of personal importance to it. Yet
 at the same time, Othello
'
s l nguag  generates this personal importance not out  
of a single, singular individual, but rather out of an accumulated weight of per
­sons, so that the final feminine pronoun in this same passage (72), amazingly,
 refers neither to Othello’s mother nor to the “Egyptian charmer,” but to the
 “sibyl”
 
who sewed the handkerchief that the charmer gave to Othello’s mother.  
Thus it is perhaps an appropriate final 
irony
 that when Othello mentions the  
handkerchief again, its meaning remains the same — it is a love token whose
 loss represents the loss of
 
love itself — but its history has been revised via an  
entirely different set of personal associations: “It was a handkerchief, an
 antique token / My father gave my mother” (5.2.216-7).
In cases such as this, narrative representation works for Othello much as it
 
does in the Deleuzian account of signification in primitive communities. Oth
­ello’s tale proceeds collectively and extra-personally, 
along
 lines of transfer in 
which individual bodies are important precisely insofar as they can stand in and
 for one another. As Deleuze and Guattari observe,
A Gourma story begins: “When the mouth was dead, the other parts of
 
the body were consulted to see which of them would take charge of the
 burial. . . .” The unities in question are never found 
in
 persons, but rather  
in series which determine the connection, disjunctions, and conjunctions of
 organs. (Anti-0edipus 142)
This sort of relation, which Deleuze and Guattari term “plurivocal,” character
­
izes primitive modes of representation in which the body stands first and fore
­most as “a part of the earth” upon which various situationally specific marks of
 relation and alliance may be coded. In contrast, Deleuze and Guattari argue,
 “Our modern societies have undertaken a 
vast
 privatization of the organs” (142-  
3), a privatization of which I consider Iago to be an outstanding dramatic rep
­resentative.
12
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Again, one may liken the effect of Othello’s storytelling to a classic exam
­
ple of deterritorialization drawn from the field of biology. Deleuze and Guat-
 tari point out that certain tropical wasps and 
orchids
 formulate a symbiotic  
relationship that also involves an element of physical mimicry (Thousand
 Plateaus 10 [see figure 4]). What distinguishes this relationship, however, is not
 so much the obvious quality of physical resemblance but rather the symbiosis
 that the resemblance renders visual; the wasp, feeding upon the orchid, trans
­fers pollen that reproduces the
 
plant,  while the plant, propagating itself through  
the transfer of pollen, yields life-sustaining nectar to the wasp. The mimicry
 
in  
this relationship is neither a cause nor an effect nor a vehicle of the symbiosis;
 wasps can pollinate flowers without looking like them, and flowers can nourish
 wasps without looking like them. What seems to be enacted in this particular
 case, thus, is not a simple relation of interdependence, nor a simple relation of
 mimicry, but something more complex: a moment in which the wasp becomes
 an orchid, completing the orchid’s reproductive cycle and entering into an asso
­ciation of physical resemblance, just as the orchid performs a reciprocal 
act
 of  
becoming-wasp. As Deleuze and Guattari comment upon such cases, “A
 becoming is not a correspondence between relations. But neither is it a resem
­blance, an imitation, or, at the limit, an identification. . . . We fall into a false
 alternative if we say that you
 either imitate or you are.
 What is real is the becoming
 itself. . . , not the supposedly
 fixed terms through which
 that which 
becomes
 passes”  
(237-8).
If nothing else, Deleuze
 
and Guattari’s model of sym
­biotic transformation affords
 us a 
new
 perspective on the  
Moor’s intimacy with Desde
­
mona.
 That relationship is  




husband and wife; Desde
­mona wishes “[t]hat heaven
 had made her such a man” as Figure 4. Wasp-orchid rhizome. Comme des Garçons.
Othello (1.3.162), thus locat
­
ing herself within a process of becoming-Othello to which the Moor himself
 contributes in describing her as his “fair warrior” 
(2.1.182).
 (As Iago observes  
with disapproval, “Our general’s wife is now the general” [2.3.315-6]). More
­over, such language points to the very literal deterritorialization of space — 
and of personal relation to space — that accompanies Desdemona’s elopement. For
 not only does marriage translate Desdemona out of the protective enclosure of
 her father’s 
house
 and into the midst of  a military campaign upon foreign soil;  
it also alters her scripted relation to the space she inhabits. Hence her initial
 encounters with Othello are constrained by her obligation to perform house
­
13
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work — “Still the house affairs would draw her thence, / Which ever as she
 
could with haste dispatch, / She’d come again 
and
 with a greedy ear / Devour  
up my discourse” (1.3.147-50) — while her personal role 
in
 Cyprus, on the  
contrary, is most prominently distinguished by her vigorous intercessions on
 behalf of
 
Cassio. This substitution of outside for inside, of foreign ground for  
homeland, and of military
 
command decisions for household chores involves an  
escape from concurrently encoded, mutually reinforcing notions of domestic
 and national and sexual and vocational territory, and to this extent it may easi
­ly 
be
 described in terms of Deleuzian lines of flight.
If her relationship with Othello offers Desdemona a way out of social and
 spatial confinement, in turn, that is because the storytelling function of Othel
­lo’s character offers her a line of flight of a particularly far-reaching variety: a
 
means
 of “transcending social estrangement” that reconfigures the selves who  
participate in it, rather than simply reinforcing a defensive alienation coexten
­sive with the signifying process itself. In short, for Othello and Desdemona
 there seems to be something consciousness-altering about the business of
 telling stories: something expansive and liberating and capable of reconfigur
­ing the terms within which one experiences the world. It is not my purpose
 here 
to
 argue that Othello’s narrative gift necessarily affects a theater audience  
in similar fashion, but it is certainly worth considering the circumstances under
 which a dramatist could invest the telling of tales with the peculiar rhetorical
 properties that it clearly possesses for Shakespeare’s tragedy. At the least, such
 circumstances may say something about how narrativity could be theorized —
 and perhaps even experienced — in the
 
Jacobean theater.
In the first instance, then, we may recall that Othello’s stories, with their
 propensity to 
fold
 time and space, repeat the signature gestures of Shake ­
spearean metatheatrical discourse. From Henry V’s rhetorical question, “Can
 this cockpit hold / The vasty fields of France?” (Prologue. 11-12) to Peter
 Quince’s claim in A Midsummer Night's Dream that “This green
 
plot shall be our 
stage, this hawthorn-brake our tiring-house” (3.1.3-4), Shakespeare’s dramatic
 technique famously superimposes the foreign
 
ground of fictional narrative upon  
a fundamentally bare theatrical space. This theatrical space, in turn, drew its
 audience appeal from linguistic representation to a degree that twentieth-cen
­tury readers and playgoers, accustomed as we are to different conventions of
 dramatic performance, may easily underestimate; as Stephen Orgel has noted,
 “[t]heater in 1605 was assumed to be a verbal medium. And acting . . . was a
 form of oratory” (16-17). This fact, in turn, implies a particularly tight homol
­ogy between Othello’s narrative performances for Desdemona, Brabantio,
 etcetera and the narrative performances that were the stock in trade of the
 Shakespearean public theater. Thus, developing within a social context in
 which its closest analogues and (to the disgust of antitheatrical Puritans) com
­petitors for audience attention included such spoken-word media as preaching,
 ballad singing, and secular oratory, Shakespeare’s theater discovers its own dou
­
ble
 in the character of Othello. A Deleuzian model of deterritorialization may  
thus expand our understanding of
 
how the Renaissance theater could be intu ­
itively apprehended by its writers and actors 
and
 possibly even some of its view ­
ers.
14
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In other words, Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of becoming may hold
 
implications not only for the dramatic relationship between Othello and Des
­demona but also for the practical relationship between the forms and the
 objects of
 
Shakespearean theatrical representation. To think of storytelling as  
a process of becoming is, given the predominantly linguistic nature of the
 Renaissance public theater, to suggest that
 
we may  understand the stage in the  
same way: not simply as a space of imitation; nor as a vehicle for what Deleuze
 and Guattari call “a correspondence between relations” (whereby, for example,
 Richard Burbage, playing Othello, might address a Globe audience in a 
way that recapitulates the relations between the character Othello and his various
 audiences); nor as a space of Burkean “courtship,” in which every effort at the
 transcendence of social estrangement is recuperated into a parallel gesture of
 ego-construction. Instead, using Othello as a model, 
we
 might propose an 
alternative view of the Shakespearean theater organized not through the struc
­tural dichotomy of being and imitation, but through the more fluid and inde
­terminate process of Deleuzian becoming. If nothing else, this fluidity and
 indeterminacy 
may
 help to account for the peculiar emotional and political  
charge associated with the 
early
 English popular theater both by its advocates  
and its detractors, for both groups arguably find themselves responding, in dif
­ferent ways, to the theater’s capacity for rendering human relations transspecif
­ic, transpersonal and to this extent transhuman as well. I believe this mode of
 theatrical 
experience
 is particularly well represented in Othello’s final speech.
5.
Othello’s last words comprise his crowning achievement as a storyteller because
 
they challenge most directly the distinction between actor and character (or, in
 more purely narrative terms, between subject and object of representation). In
 this respect one may recall Robert Weimann’s analysis of Shakespearean Fig-
 urenposition, the spatial disposition of the actor’s body so as to “generate a
 unique stage presence that establishes a special relationship between himself
 and 
his
 fellow actors, the play, or the audience” (230). For Weimann, this spe ­
cial relationship is an outgrowth of the traditional opposition between upstage
 and downstage positions (locus and plated) in the medieval theater, and it leads
 to a continuum of
 
dramatic representation that on one end (the platea) privi ­
leges 
an
 actor’s interaction with his audience and at  the other extreme privileges  
the character’s interaction with other characters. Harry Berger, Jr. has recently
 revisited this distinction in order to observe that the actor, as actor, cannot 
be so easily scripted into an exclusive relationship with the audience, for the sim
­ple reason that in his role as a dramatic character the actor is always inevitably
 and simultaneously interacting both with other dramatic characters and with
 other actors. As Berger asks, “Is Hamlet as Hamlet aware of his fellow actors
 or
 
of his fellow characters?”  (“The  Prince’s Dog” 48). The question is ultimately  
unanswerable, for in Deleuzian terms actor and character deterritorialize 
one another, forming a theatrical parallel to the mutually sustaining relationship of
 orchid-wasp to wasp-orchid. As I have argued above, this relationship is also
15
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refigured, on the level
 
of character  alone, through the  interaction  of Othello and  
Desdemona.
In short, the actor threatens to disrupt the essential “standoffishness” or
 
“division” constitutive of Burkean rhetoric, for the actor himself is always
 already subject to multiple ego-structures and multiple modes of articulation.
 If, as Deleuze and Guattari maintain, “the unconscious itself [is] fundamental
­ly a crowd” (Thousand Plateaus 29), the actor renders this tendency toward pro
­liferation particularly explicit, and with
 
threatening implications for any unitary,  
self-identified notion of character or personality. With his final words, thus,
 Othello elides the roles of actor and character in a way that also forces an eli
­
sion
 between character and audience. “Soft you; a word or two before you go”  
(5.2.338) introduces his speech with a pronoun 
reference
 that points ambiva ­
lently to the character Lodovico, who is about to bear the wounded Iago off to
 torture, and
 
to an audience  that is likewise  preparing to depart the  theater as the  
play’s performance draws to an end, while the very next line
 
— “I have done the  
state some service” — arguably registers parity between Othello’s role as a ser
­vant of the Venetian senate and the King’s Men’s role as servants of the English
 crown. Having thus, in his speech’s preamble, made available an elaborate par
­allelism between the roles of actor, characters, and 
audience,
 Othello then pro ­
ceeds to a series of requests, commands, and declarations that render these roles
 not only
 
parallel but inextricable and mutually sustaining.
“I pray you, in your letters, / When you shall these unlucky 
deeds
 relate, /  
Speak of me as I am” (340-2): Othello asks Lodovico to “relate” his deeds in
 “letters” that “speak” of him accurately, and the juxtaposition of contradictory
 modes of discourse, one (the written) appropriate to Lodovico and another (the
 spoken) more fitting to a theater audience, is arguably more than coincidence.
 The operative
 
verb “speak” reappears one line later (“Then must you speak / Of  
one that lov’d not wisely but too well” [343-4]), whereas Othello can revert 
to a clear reliance
 
upon  the written word  eight lines after that (“Set you down  this”  
[351]); as a reader or spectator tracks these usages from writing to speaking to
 speaking and back again to writing, their aggregate effect is to superimpose
 audience upon character. Moreover, in their form as commands or exhortations
 dictating a particular spoken or written
 
message, these constructions elide audi ­
ence with 
actor;
 each onlooker, recalling and relating to others the events of  
Othello’s death, steps into the position prepared for him/her by the actor per
­forming the role of
 
Othello: “Speak of me as I am; nothing extenuate, / Nor  
set down aught in malice” (342-3). Telling his own story to us, Othello antic
­ipates us (and Lodovico) telling it in turn to others, in the parallel universes of
 extratheatrical reality and of dramatic
 
fiction, and we, by telling the story in our  
turn, not only recapitulate and perpetuate the narrative function exemplified 
by Othello himself but also enact the future 
events
 demanded by the play’s own  
narrative impulse.
This complicated pattern of anticipation and interdependence may also
 
repeat itself in Othello’s disparaging references to ethnic others: the “base
 [Indian]” (or, in the Folio reading, “Judean”) who, like Othello, “threw a pearl
 away / Richer than all his tribe” (347-8); and the “malignant and . . . turban’d
 Turk” whom Othello recalls slaying in Aleppo (353). On 
one
 hand, these  
16





register the sense of ethnic inferiority that Othello has acquired 
by the end of his play; in dispraising the “base [Indian]” and “malignant . . .
 Turk,” Othello dispraises himself. Yet this dispraise simultaneously functions
 as the vehicle for an assertion of
 
superiority; Othello rises above his base and  
malignant self by repeating a gesture of punishment drawn from his own past,
 and by doing so he renders the relations between actor, character, and audience
 more involuted than ever. “I took by th’ throat the circumcised dog, / And
 smote him — thus” (355-6): who is the actor here? 
Is
 it Burbage playing the  
role of Othello, or
 
is it Othello playing  the role of Othello, or is it Othello play ­
ing the role of the “circumcised dog” who receives punishment from Othello in
 his role as Othello, 
or
 Burbage who, as Othello playing the “ circumcised dog,”  
receives punishment from himself? And who is the audience? Is it the actor
 playing Lodovico, or is it the Venetian senate whose judgment Othello antici
­pates, or is it the Othello who anticipates and preempts that senates judgment,
 or is it the Globe audience whose judgment Othello likewise anticipates and
 seeks to influence or preempt through his performance — an audience that in
 its judiciary capacity inevitably recapitulates the workings of the senate 
to which Othello’s words are also addressed?
The moral of this essay is not that any 
one
 of these notions of actor, or  
character, or audience must prevail, nor is it that Othello successfully achieves a
 sustainable discursive condition in which the “standoffishness” of Burkean
 rhetoric is rendered void. But I would, at the least, maintain that Othello envi
­sions the possibility of such a condition, and that through the startling narra
­tive juxtapositions and conflations of its principal character, the play offers us a
 glimpse of what such a condition might be
 like.
 In the process, too, it may give  
us a ind of insight into Shakespeare’s intuitive sense of the theater: of its
 appeal and function, and the peculiar nature of the power it may exert over
 actors and audiences alike. At 
any
 rate, on  thing is clear: Othello’s story ­
telling, for
 
whatever reason, exerts a time-tested ability to manipulate his audi ­
tors, insisting that they become storytellers — his storytellers — in turn. It is




In the case of Lacan, desire exists as the unassuageable consequence of  
the speaking subject’s entry into consciousness and the symbolic order. It
 develops through the infant’s mirror-stage estrangement from its mother as
 well as from the self-estrangement consequent upon linguistic representation,
 and it provides the enduring sense of lack that linguistic utterance is designed
 to repair upon immediate local levels, but which stands as the ultimately
 ineradicable precondition for utterance itself. Thus, for Lacan, “Discontinuity
 . . . is the essential form in which the unconscious first appears to us as a phe
­nomenon” (25), while the idea of a unitary consciousness develops as “a sort of
 double of the organism in which this false unity is thought to reside” (26). For
 Derrida, the immediate focus of différance is the formal self-estrangement of
 the signifying function: the fissure that opens up in linguistic representation
17
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between signifier and signified, the latter of which is primordially different
 
from and deferred by the former, with the result that “[t]he center [of a signi
­
fying
 function] is at the center of the totality, and yet, since the center does not  
belong to the totality .. ., the totality has its center elsewhere” (279). The pri
­ority of estrangement
 
within  both of these theories of language and conscious ­
ness helps to relate them to Burkean analysis.
2.
 
For a range of noteworthy examples, see Greenblatt 222-54; Sinfield 29-  
51; Wayne 153-79; Bates 51-60; and Hopkins 159-74.
3.
 
See Sedgwick  35, for instance: Shakespeares “[s]onnets present a male ­
male love that, like the love of the Greeks, is set firmly
 
within a structure of  
institutionalized social relations that are carried out via women: marriage,
 name, family, loyalty to progenitors and posterity, all depend on the youths
 making a particular use of women that is not, in the abstract, seen as opposing,
 denying, or detracting from his bond to the speaker.” In this context, “women
 are merely the vehicles by which men breed more men, 
for




Bruce Smith is only one of many recent scholars who have noted that  
“[n]o 
one
 in Shakespeare’s day would have labeled himself a ‘homosexual.’ The  
term itself is a clinical, 
scientific
 coinage of the clinical, scientific nineteenth  
century. ‘Bugger’ and ‘sodomite,’ the closest equivalents in early modern Eng
­lish, . .. [lack] exactitude, since ‘buggery’ was also used to refer to bestiality and
 ‘sodomy’ could cover a variety
 
of heterosexual acts. ... For individuals and their  
self-identity this definition, or lack of definition, had enormous consequences”
 (11). Thus, as Alan Bray has noted, “To talk of an individual in this period as






Carol Neely, for one, thus notes that “Iago offers to compensate” for  
Othello’s loss of Desdemona “with his own love,” and that act 3, scene 3 “con
­cludes with Othello’s attempt to replace his love for Desdemona with a . . .
 bond with Iago” (91).6.
 
The relation between discourses of criminality and morbidity is perva ­
sive in
 
the Renaissance, as well as being fundamentally theological in nature. In  
his study of birth abnormalities, for instance, Paré claims that “most often
 
these  
monstrous and marvelous creatures proceed from the judgment of God, who
 permits fathers and mothers to produce such abominations from the disorder
 that they make in copulation, like brutish beasts, in
 
which their appetite guides  
them, without respecting the time, or other laws ordained 
by
 God and Nature”  
(5). Thus Paré’s medical abnormalities serve to punish criminality, just as
 Coke’s laws serve to punish “unnatural” and “sinful” behavior: “Buggery is a
 detestable and abominable sin . . . against the ordinance of the Creator and
 order of nature” (Coke sig. I3v).
7.
 
See Foucault passim, especially 53-73.
8.
 
Lisa Hopkins, in particular,  claims that Iago’s approach  to narrative rep ­
resentation is “far more sophisticated” than Othello’s (168),
 
which figures “nar ­
ration [as] a transparent mode” (163). Yet Hopkins also rightly observes that
 Iago “is a poorer narrator and stager than Othello” (168), and the present essay
 seeks to account for Othello’s narrative gift as something other than a lack of
 sophistication.
18





For Adelman, “Othello’s black skin” comes, through the process of pro ­
jection, to serve as “the container for [Iago’s] own interior blackness” (130):
 “Insofar as Iago can make Othello 
experience
 his own blackness as a contami ­
nation . . . , he succeeds in emptying himself out into Othello” (144).
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